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Social Structure and Cultural Orientation
Traditional terminology in Surakarta recognized three social 
classes. First, there were the santono dalem, or family of the ruler, 
categorized as the group of noblemen and princes and thus as the ruling 
class. Second, there were the abdi dalem, the officials or bureaucrats 
of the kingdom. Third were the kawula dalem, the masses, in other 
words, the ruled. From this elementary division it is clear that the 
first two classes were ruling classes, while the third was the r u le d .1 
The structure of a ruling class is determined by political type, cul­
tural level and individual differences. By taking these three factors 
into account, we can understand the totality of the social structure 
of feudal society.
Koentjaraningrat has shown that Javanese society in general, and 
Central Javanese society in particular, was divided into two main 
groups, the wong oilik [little people] and the priyayi [gentry].2 This 
division was very clear in Surakarta. The santono dalem and the abdi 
dalem there could be categorized as the priyayi, with a subdivision 
between priyayi gede (priyagung) or upper priyayi, and priyayi oilik 
or lower priyayi. The kawula dalem corresponded to the wong c ilik .
(In connection with Geertz' trichotomy of santri, abangan and priyayi,
I believe that in Surakarta essentially four groups existed: santri
priyayi, abangan priyayi, santri wong cilik  and abangan wong c i l i k .3) 
The social distance between the priyayi and the wong cilik  was very 
great.4 Social positions were very difficult to achieve5 and social
1. "Ruling social class" indicates that class "which performs all political func­
tions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantage that power brings." The ruled 
class is the class that serves the ruling class. See Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling 
Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50.
2. See Koentjaraningrat, "Tjelapar: Sebuah Desa di Djawa Tengah Bagian Selatan," in 
Koent j araningrat (ed.), Masjarakat Desa di Indonesia (Jakarta: Universitas Indo­
nesia, 1970), p. 140.
3. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 118-21, 
224. For a comparison of the division priyayi-wong cilik and santri-abangan- 
priyayi, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants1 Revolt of Banten in 1888, Its 
Condition, Course and Sequel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), p. 50, note 84. Cf. 
Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Struktur sosial dari masjarakat tradisionil dan kolonial," 
Lembaran Sedjarah (Fakultas Sastra dan Kebudayaan, Universitas Gajah Mada, 
Yogyakarta), No. 4 (1969), p. 32.
4. The concept of social position is borrowed here from Nicholas S. Timasheff, 
Sociological Theory, Its Nature and Growth (New York: Random House, 1967),
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mobility from the wong cilik  up into the priyayi was very rare.
In Surakarta the santri priyayi consisted mainly of officials in 
the religious domain. They were called abdi dalem pangulon or abdi 
dalem pametakan (the latter term being drawn from the root petak 
[white] as opposed to abang [red] in abangan). The abdi dalem pangu­
lon consisted of Penghulu (with the rank of Raden Temenggung) at the 
top, Katib, Ngulomodamel, Jaksa, Ngulomomiji, Muazin, Mudarin,
Kebayan, Syarif and Marbot.5 6 Another religious group which could be 
classified as religious officials were the abdi dalem Suronatan, who 
had special responsibility for taking care of the Suronata Mosque and 
the Great Mosque. The abdi dalem pangulonfs functions were to handle 
marriage and inheritance among the priyantun dalem and thepriyantun 
jawi. The entire body of royal religious officials can be termed the 
official religious elite . The segment of this group which resided in 
the villages was known as the abdi dalem perdikan. It consisted of 
juru tebah, marbot and modin, whose responsibility was to take care of 
royal tombs outside the city.
The santri wong cilik  generally included those who studied r e li­
gion in pondok or pesantren under kjai or ulama. In relation to the 
traditional bureaucracy these elements can be classified as the "un­
official religious e l i t e . " 7 The more important pesantren in Surakarta 
were Jamsar^n (near the c ity ), Kacangan (Boyolali) and Kalioso (Sragen). 
During the Revolution the santri from these pesantrdn played a key role 
in organizing local defense.
The abangan wong cilik  in general inhabited both the villages and 
the towns. Most of the official staff of the kalurahan desa [adminis­
trative village] were abangan (except for the modin), and these people 
formed the village e l i t e .8 The typical feature of politics in the v il ­
lage, as a traditional political institution, was decision-making by 
musyawarah and mufakat.9 The concept of gotong-royong was exploited
p. 315. Social position refers to social groups which are formed by individuals 
and stand in a "patterned relationship."
5. There are two types of social position in society--those easily obtained and 
those achieved only with difficulty. See Peter I. Rose (ed.), The Study of 
Society (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 330.
6. On the abdi dalem pangulon, see my paper "Kolonialisme Barat dan Kemunduran 
Radja2 Surakarta abad XIX," presented to the second National History Seminar in 
Yogyakarta, August 26-29, 1970, pp. 17-19.
7. Cf. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Develop­
ment," in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 78.
8. Within village government the village elite consists of: the lurah, carik,
bayan, ulu2, modin, jogoboyo. Cf. Margo L. Lyon, Bases of Conflict in Rural Java 
(Berkeley: University of Berkeley, Research Monograph Series No. 3, 1970), pp. 
32-34. Before the Proclamation of Independence there were other components of 
the village elite such as: petinggi, ronggo, demang, etc. See R. Soepomo, De 
Reorganisatie van het Agrarische Stelsel in het Gewest Soerakarta (The Hague: L. 
Gerretsen, 1927), p. 20.
9. Jeanne S. Mintz, Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism 
(New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 12-13, 15.
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with brilliant success during the Revolution for the purposes of re­
pairing rail-lines, roads, buildings and irrigation systems.10 Gotong- 
royong also greatly facilitated mobilization for local defense.
Feudal society was also marked by two cultures--a palace culture 
(essentially priyayi) and a popular culture (essentially that of the 
wong c il ik ) . These cultures were distinctive in their use of language, 
art, morality, ethics, manners, dress and housing. In art, we find a 
palace art and a popular a r t .11 In the Surakarta kraton, for example, 
the Bedoyo Ketawang, a magico-religious dance of great refinement and 
complex symbolism, was performed.12 By contrast, the dances of the wong 
cilik  in the villages, such as the Tari Tayub, Ande2 Lumut and so forth, 
were marked by their spontaneity. Among the wong cilik  wayang was and 
is extremely important: it is the popular art-form for ceremonial pur­
poses (births, marriages, village purifications, harvest celebrations, 
e t c .) .  Feudal culture as a cultural whole thus consisted of a sub­
culture created by the priyayi and a contra-culture created by the wong 
c i l i k .13
We can see then that the class division between the priyayi and 
the wong cilik  gave rise to a cultural dualism between priyayi culture 
and wong cilik  culture. During the Revolution, however, priyayi cul­
ture, carried along by the flow of the national revolution, became 
democratized, so that in the end there was no great difference left 
between it and wong cilik  culture.
To give power to the ruler and to ensure the security and w ell­
being of his government, ceremonies and offerings were continually made 
within the palace. One ceremony which was very popular in Solonese 
society was the Kirab Pusoko Kraton on the first of the Javanese month 
Suro .14 People believed that the Kirab Pusoko could protect them from 
sickness and social disorder and could ensure that their lives would 
be tata tentvem kartoraharjo. 15
10. Ibid.
11. Koentjaraningrat uses the terms "elite art" and "popular art" and suggests that 
although there was a wide gulf between the two, they nonetheless influenced one 
another. See his "Saranan Perkembangan Kesenian," paper given to the Art Semi­
nar in Surakarta, October 2-4, 1972, p. 4.
12. For full details, see K. G. P. H. Hadiwidjojo, Bedojo Ketawang (Surakarta: Radyo 
Pustoko, 1971).
13. The terms contra-culture and sub-culture are borrowed from J. Milton Yinger; 
see Rose, Study, pp. 827-38. Here contra-culture means cultural elements in 
contradiction with dominant cultural values.
14. According to Kirab Pusoko Karaton Surakarta (Surakarta: Radyo Pustoko, 1972), 
the main kraton pusoko are: (a) spears (Kanjeng Kyai Kebo Mas, Kanjeng Kyai 
Panatas, Kyai Slamet, Kyai Baru); (b) kris (Kanjeng Kyai Balabar, Kanjeng Kyai 
Baruwang, etc.); (c) various pennons; (d) kraton pet animals such as the white 
water-buffalo Kyai Slamet.
15. Anderson links tata tentrem kartoraharjo with the manifestation o"f "power.”
See Benedict R. 0 fG. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Holt, 
Culture and Politics, p. 19.
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The Formation of Laskar2 Rakyat in Surakarta
The months September to December 1945 were the period when the 
laskar were formed by the pemuda of Surakarta. They were initially  
subsumed in the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR). In October 1945 the BKR, 
the military and the police occupied the Kempeitai (Japanese military 
police) headquarters in Timuran. After this event, a variety of d i f ­
ferent laskar organizations sprang up both in the towns and in the v il ­
lages. Each laskar organization had its own peculiar form and style. 
Some of the more important popular movements were: the Barisan Laskar
Banteng (BLB) with green uniforms, under Dr. Muwardi; the Pemuda Sosia- 
lis Indonesia (Pesindo); the Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia 
(BPRI), which was made up of pemuda from all social strata; and the 
Laskar Rakyat, which used yellow uniforms.
According to my informants, the most important role in Surakarta 
itself was taken by student laskar. Prior to the formation of the 
Student Army (T P ), students had been mobilized into various organiza­
tions, including the Pasukan Satria (PS), the Laskar Kere (KR ), the 
Barisan Polisi Istimewa Sekolah Menengah Tinggi (B'PISMT) , the Barisan 
Pemuda Jelata (B P J), and the BPRI. The Student Army itself was only 
formed in September 1946. According to the same informants, the lead­
ers were Prakosa, Soebroto and Achmadi.16 17 The members of the TP got 
their education on the battlefield , especially during the Independence 
Wars--their teachers were known as guru2 perguangan [resistance teach­
ers] . 1 7
In mid-1947 the Gabungan Laskar Perjuangan Surakarta was set up in 
which the Student Army played a key military, political and social role. 
The Gabungan had the responsibility of collecting foodstuffs and send­
ing pejuang up to the front lines. The Student Army and the military 
established a City Military Command, which included three Student Army 
people as leaders--Achmadi, Prakosa and A. Latief. On March 27, 1948, 
the Student Army began a purge of people from the BPRI and the Banteng 
laskar who were involved in corruption, blackmarketeering and robbery.18 
They regarded these acts as deviations from the Revolution.
At the beginning of 1946 local defense organizations were also 
formed in the rural areas. They were composed of village youths, 
political leaders and religious notables. The names of these organiza­
tions varied from area to area: among them may be mentioned the Laskar
Rakyat Surakarta (LRS) in the village of Plupuh (Sragdn), the Pemuda 
Laskar Rakyat (PLR), the Pemuda Penjaga Desa (PPD), the Pelopor Laskar 
Rakyat (PLR), and the Markas Pertahanan Rakyat (MPR). Frequently more 
than one laskar organization could be found in a single village. For 
example, in Plupuh there was a Pemuda Laskar Rakyat (PLR) and a Gerakan 
Sabillilah (Islam ic). The latter was led by Musaban, who aroused the 
local Islamic youth with the gi-had spirit.
16. Interview with Soepardi, Soepeno and Soedarmo on April 20, 1973 and May 1973. 
According to Soepardi, Prakosa led the Student Army very ably; hfs outstanding 
qualities were simplicity, honesty, courage and an ability to look properly 
after his subordinates.
17. Interview with Soedarmono in May 1973.
18. Sartono links actions of this type with "social unrest." See his Peasants' 
Revolt, p. 134.
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The pemuda organization for the kabupatSn of SragSn was the Angka- 
tan Muda Sukowati (AMS), among whose leaders were Panudi, Indardjo and 
Soemodarmodjo. According to the statements of the AMS itself, it 
wanted the formation of an autonomous government in the kabupatdn of 
SragSn no longer linked to the royal government. The AMS subsequently 
played an important political role. It later changed its name to Badan 
Perjuangan Angkatan Muda Sukowati (BPAMS). According to Totosiswanto, 
one of its later leaders, the BPAMS was extremely active in support of 
the military during the Independence War of 1948.
All the village defense organizations arose spontaneously and 
elected their own leaderships. They collected materiel, primarily 
foodstuffs, from the local peasantry. In this context the role of the 
village headmen in collecting materiel and mobilizing manpower was very 
important.
During the War of Independence all members of the village defense 
units participated in the guerrilla fighting. The villagers formed 
Pasukan Gerilya Desa (Village Guerrilla Units) or Pager D esa .19 Peas­
ants who sold their produce in the towns often provided information on 
concentrations of Dutch military strength to the Pager Desa or to other 
military units. Members of the Pager Desa used gvanggang [pointed bam­
boo staves], bamboo spears, machetes and bandil (a weapon used by 
kraton soldiers for hurling stones). They also used jimat [amulets]20 
such as Tanjungsari and Kulbuntet to ward off danger from the enemy. 
Some of them also used to perform tapa or semadi [ascetic meditation] 
in solitary places such as Mt. Lawu. For according to popular belief 
the Sunan Lawu would give strength [power] to those who meditated on 
this mountain. Meditation on Mr. Lawu is still practiced today by the 
Javanese in general, and in particular by the people of Central Java. 
Tapa and semadi on this mountain are done to achieve security and pros­
perity, kasektdn [magical power], and good fortune.21 Still other mem­
bers of the Pager Desa visited guru2 ngelmu [teachers of esoteric 
knowledge] and dukun to obtain invulnerability, safety or military 
prowess. They called themselves tunggal-guru or tunggal-banyu, meaning 
that here were elements loyal to their guru. Some examples of these 
phenomena were: the pilgrimage of some laskar rakyat elements to the
village of Cokrotulung to obtain invulnerability from Kyai Mangunhar- 
tono.22 Some members of the Student Army also went to the home of Kyai 
Jurumartani to obtain invulnerability, according to Saryono, Sunardi
19. [The acronym Pager also means "fence."—Translator.]
20. Jimat can give protection from danger, sickness, and death, and can increase 
vulnerability. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism," p. 79.
21. Tapa and semadi are an important element in Javanese cultural life, occurring 
not only in Surakarta but also in the other regions of Java. Smail has already 
pointed to this phenomenon in his study of the history of the Revolution in 
Bandung. See John R. W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946. A 
Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1964), p. 77.
22. According to Sunardi, a member of the Laskar Rakyat/BKR who once visited Kyai 
Mangunhartono in 1947, all his pupils were forbidden to eat for seven or even 
sometimes up to 40 days (the ban was on food with salt in it ). After his 
pupils had completed their assigned tasks, the guru tested their invulnerabil­
ity. Interview, May 17, 1973.
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and Soedarmo; all who came to the kyai were given charms for invul­
nerability, but they also had to go without food or drink for a week. 
Some people from other laskar units went to the village of Parakan in 
Kedu to get invulnerability from sharpened bamboo spears. It is cer­
tainly true that the Gerakan Bambu Runcing from Parakan was famous at 
that time among the members of the laskar organizations and the m ili­
tary: they believed that sharpened spears from Parakan had real
kasektSn, and were full of magic. In this respect the Gerakan Bambu 
Runcing of Parakan can be compared with the Gerakan Tebu Ireng from 
Jombang.
Social Conflicts and Social Unrest
The Indonesian Revolution of 1945-50 can well be described as 
Mmulti-complex. ” 23 It was not merely decolonization, but a revolution 
full of social tensions and political conflicts between social classes.24 
In the realm of politics and ideology, there was a struggle to the 
death between Masyumi and the communists which culminated in the commu­
nist rebellion at Madiun.25 The Linggardjati and Renville agreements 
sharpened antagonisms between the "communist group” and the "socialist 
group” led by Sutan Sjahrir. The People’ s Democratic front (FDR ),26 a 
political instrument of the communists, publicly denounced the Renville 
Agreement and began to purge itself of Sjahrir*s followers. In the 
early months of 1948, the FDR began to gather its forces to confront 
the government.
Political antagonisms at the national level exerted a powerful in ­
fluence on political antagonisms and social tensions in Surakarta. On
23. Taufik Abdullah has stated that the Indonesian Revolution was a "multi-complex 
revolution in one generation," full of energy, romanticism, etc. See his review 
of Benedict R. 0*G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Re­
sistance 1944-1946 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), in Prisma,
II, No. 2 (April 1973), p. 71.
24. Some examples of social tensions in 1946 are: (1) The Social Revolution in North 
Sumatra. See W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (Bandung and The 
Hague: van Hoeve, 1956), p. 278; and George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolu­
tion in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 179-82.
(2) In Bali social tensions developed between the kaum ningrat [aristocracy] and 
the masses who were led by the civilian nationalist elite. The kaum ningrat 
came together in the Dewan Raja2 (Council of Rulers). See Njoman S. Pendit,
Bali Berdjuang (Den Pasar: Jajasan Kebaktian Pedjuang, 1954), p. 158. Cf. A. 
Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia 1945-1949 (Bandung: van Hoeve, 
1955), p. 118. The Balinese Council of Rulers clearly supported the 1946 fed­
erative government of Bali [linking together the eight principalities of Bali] 
conceived by Dr. H. J. van Mook. (3) In Surakarta from 1946 on social tensions 
arose between the kaum ningrat and the mass of the population. See my paper 
"Perubahan2 Sosial Politik di Surakarta sesudah 1945," discussed in the Fakultas 
Sastra, University of Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta, in 1970.
25. See Wertheim, Indonesian Society, p. 222, n. 1, citing C. A. 0. van Nieuwen- 
huijze  ^ Mens en Vrijheid in Indonesie (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1949), pp. 203-5.
26. The strength of the FDR rested on: (1) the loyalty of the military to Sjarifud- 
din who was then Minister of Defense; (2) SOBSI. But at the time of the 1948 
Madiun coup, it did not in fact get full support from these groups. See Mintz, 
Mohammed, p. 92.
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June 27, 1946 Prime Minister Sjahrir was kidnapped in Surakarta by an 
MunknownM gang. But it could be assumed that the group behind the kid­
napping came from S jahrir ’ s political opposition. It was socialists 
versus communists, with the communist leaders taking a strong opposi­
tion line against the government, which was pursuing a policy of nego­
tiations with the Dutch.27 At the same time domestic political factors 
caused civil wars and political conflicts in various regions.
The central governments policy of appointing Iskak as Resident of 
Surakarta and R. Soediro as Vice-Resident caused several badan perjua- 
ngan to react with a [joint] resolution. On October 8, 1946 they con­
veyed their resolution to the government. On November 9, Resident 
Iskak and Soediro were kidnapped by an unidentified political organi­
zation. R. Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo took over the position of 
Resident but as he was in favor of the feudal group, the Sunanate and 
the Mangkunegaran, the political parties and the members of the DPRD 
refused to accept him. One can see in all this conflict a small seg­
ment of the ’’government e lite” trying to help the kaum ningrat to re­
store their authority. Reactions came swiftly from those political 
parties who called themselves the kaum revolusionev. Yet among the 
ningrat or priyayi there were people who were regarded as ’’revolution­
ary priy ay i,” among them K .P .H . Mr. Sumodiningrat, K .G .P .M . Surjohami- 
djojo (both members of the Surakarta KNI) and B .R .M .P . Mlojosunardjo, 
whose houses were used for political gatherings and meetings of guer­
rilla  leaders.
In August and September 1948 serious social and political conflicts 
arose between the badan perjuangan, the laskar, the military and the 
political parties. The communists certainly regarded the Hatta govern­
ment’ s policy of rationalization and demobilization as a deviation from 
the Revolution.28 Demonstrations against rationalization took place in 
Surakarta and Blitar. Under the influence of the communist leader 
Musso, the Fourth Division (Senopati) in Surakarta refused to accept 
either demobilization or rationalization .29 Instead it demanded that 
the government withdraw the Third Division (Siliwangi) from Surakarta. 
(The Siliwangi Division, known as the Hijrah Army or the Pocket Army, 
had arrived in Surakarta in February 1 9 4 8 .)30 On September 13, 1948
27. Strong communist opposition to the Sjahrir government developed from January 
1946 on. In June 1946, Tan Malaka!s communist group attempted a coup d’etat, 
kidnapping Sjahrir and some of his colleagues. Through his Persatuan Perjuangan 
Tan Malaka consistently tried to overthrow the government. See D. G. E. Hall, A 
History of Southeast Asia (London and New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 720-21; 
Mintz, Mohammed, p. 97.
28. Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 
1971), p. 134. Certain anti-rationalization groups regarded rationalization as 
’’preparation for the formation of a federal army.” See Moela Marboen, Peristiwa 
Madiun (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah Angkatan Bersenjata, n .d .), p. 2.
29. Dahm, History, p. 134.
30. [By the terms of the Renville Agreement, Republican troops were moved out of 
pockets behind Dutch lines (the so-called Van Mook line), and into the dimin­
ished territory of the Republic. General Sudirman, the Panglima of the Repub­
lican Armed Forces, called this movement a hij rah, after the Prophet’s flight 
to Medina before his triumphant return to Mecca, as a sign that the retreat in 
the face of the Dutch was only temporary.--Translator.]
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there occurred the Srambatan A f f a i r .31 The barracks of the Hijrah Army 
were attacked by a group from the ALRI (Navy), which supported the com­
munists under the leadership of Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin.
It was clear then that the political conflicts in Surakarta had 
turned into a civil war. This war then spread out into neighboring re­
g io n s ,32 including Purwodadi, Ponorogo and Madiun.33 According to 
documents found in Amir Sjarifuddin1s house, the FDR had planned to 
turn Surakarta into a MWild West" or zone of chaos.34
Before the Madiun Affair itself broke out on September 18, 1948, 
the communists in Surakarta had been strengthening their Red Army. Its 
membership was composed of Pesindo, FDR, part of ALRI and part of the 
Laskar Rakyat. In the rural areas around Surakarta, the Red Army was 
known as MussoTs Army. As for the military in Surakarta itse lf , at one 
meeting they were asked by their leaders: "Melu Musso apa melu Bung
Karno? (Do you go along with Muso or with Bung Karno?)"35
In rural areas, as for example in Sragdn, Klatdn and Karanganyar, 
the communists tried to get support from peasants who had joined Pokoso 
(Perkumpulan Kawulo Surokarto). It is clear that the communists looked 
for their backing among the wong abangan36 of the peasantry. And in 
Pokoso they urged the wong cilik  to oppose the wong priyayi.
The influence of the communists in the rural areas meant a p o lit i­
cization of the peasantry and a mobilization of the villagers. P o liti­
cal conflicts arose between the pro-communist wong tani and the anti­
communist wong tani, especially the kaum santri. When the Madiun 
Affair erupted, these political conflicts reached their culmination in 
killings, which among the rural communities of Surakarta were known as 
"beldhan PKI Musso [slaughter of Musso's P K I] ."
Social-political conflicts also arose between the feudalists (or 
priyayi) and the santri. When on December 20, 1948, the Dutch entered 
the city of Surakarta in order to establish their authority, they re­
ceived help from a portion of the priyayi. Bad economic conditions 
since the beginning of 1946 had caused the spread of corruption, em­
bezzlement of the assets of state enterprises, and anarchosyndicalism 
in the region controlled by the Republic of Indonesia.37 Economic con­
ditions of this type also spawned an increase in banditry and robbery.38
31. For more detail, see Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta 1945-1953 (Surakarta: 
Djawatan Penerangan Surakarta, 1953), pp. 12-13.
32. Dahm, History, p. 134. 33. Kenang-Kenangan, pp. 12-13.
34. Moela Marboen, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 4.
35. Interview with Soedarmo, member of the Student Army. He stated that those who
were pro-Musso left the meeting at that point, saying ’’we1!! meet again on the 
battlefield.” Interview, May 1973.
36. Thus the Communist Party in Surakarta pushed for the political mobilization of 
the wong abangan. See Lyon, Bases, p. 35.
37. Soekarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera 
Revolusi, 1965), II, pp. 11-12.
38. According also to Wertheim, Indonesian Society, p. 144, the chaos caused by war 
and revolution brought with it a rise in robberies.
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This can be shown to have occurred in various regions including Sura­
karta. In 1947 some members of the Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indo­
nesia (BPRI) under Mardjuki committed robberies in the countryside 
especially in the village of Cokrotulung (kabupatSn Boyolali) and 
various places in Salatiga and Ungaran.39 Some members of the ALRI in 
Surakarta did likewise, for example Ahmad Jadau .40 4123 It is clear that 
the actions of pejuang very frequently resembled banditry .1*1
In 1948 we in Surakarta got to know the names of well-known 
robbers who were much feared by the people. Prawiroadidjojo committed 
robberies in the city itself. *+2 In the kabupatdn of Srag£n a prominent 
robber named Dul Latif did likewise in the towns. And in the village 
of Sidoharjo (kabupatSn of Sragdn), the villagers were thrown into 
great confusion by criminals and robbers. In Srag§n the kabupatSn 
government established a court of summary justice, known by the name 
snellreahten, 43 to sentence these criminals.
It is clear that social unrest helped to cause these robberies, 
banditries, and chaos. Social protests accompanied by vandalism 
occurred when the local people attacked foreign asiatics, especially 
Chinese and Arabs, who were classed as bourgeoisie. In 1949 the people 
burned shops belonging to Chinese, for example Toko Obral and Toko Eng 
Bo. The people also burned Kampung Arab, a batik-manufacturing center 
near the Pasar Kliwon. This incident came to be known as the Anwar 
Sungkar incident. Some Arabs under the leadership of Anwar Sungkar 
helped the Dutch by pointing out guerrilla centers of the laskar organ­
izations .
In December 1948 the Chinese in the kabupat§n of Srag£n formed a 
committee to welcome the Dutch troops which was called the Ontvangst 
Committee. The mass of the local people protested against these Chi­
nese and so social conflicts arose between the people and the Chinese. 
In the area of Kedawung and Gondang there were some Chinese killed.
Social protests resulting from low wages of teachers in the Mang- 
kunegaran came from the Teachers* Association of the kabupatSn of 
Karanganyar, especially from the Kapangwon of Tawangmangu. This 
Teachers1 Association under Tjiptosuwignjo had sent a formal resolu­
tion of protest to the Mangkunegoro. The main point of the resolution 
was that they wanted to be freed from the control of the Mangkunegoro1s 
administration.
In the tide of the Revolution the traditional bureaucratic elite , 
which consisted of the aristocrats and princes, tried to get help from
39. Interview with Soedarmono, May 15, 1973. He knew a good deal about the BPRI, 
and was in 1948 a teacher in a Christian school in Surakarta. Also interviews 
with Soedarmono, Soepeno and Soepardi on April 20, 1973. As former members of 
the Student Army, they told me how they had helped put down the BPRI robberies.
40. Soedarmo said that both Mardjuki and Ahmad Jadau were killed by members of the 
Student Army.
41. Cf. Wertheim, Indonesian Society, p. 144.
42. Interview with Saryono, a member of the BKR during the Revolution, on May 17, 
1973.
43. Interview with R. Soemodarmodjo, member of the summary court, May 18, 1973.
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the lower classes which were still lo y al .44 Some princes such as Gusti 
Surjomidjojo, Gusti Djojokusumo and Pangdran Mangkubumi tried to get 
assistance from the peasants who supported the Perkumpulan Kawulo Suro- 
karto (Pokoso). In 1950 Djojokusumo organized a meeting of Pokoso 
peasants in the Sasonomulyo (name of a place in the kraton). The aim 
of the meeting was to reestablish a Swapraja [autonomous royal] govern­
ment. All the Pokoso members, who came from rural areas in the kabu- 
pat§n of Sragdn and KlatSn, supported these plans of the priyayi. We 
know of course that the abangan peasantry with traditionalist ideas 
and traditional social types were glad to support the feudal system of 
administration. But, as a result, the mass of the people who called 
themselves kaum revolusioner formed an Anti-Swapraja Committee. Polit­
ical protests came from the parties against the priyayi, and these 
parties publicized the slogan of antifeudalism among the masses of the 
local people.
Administrative Changes
Dutch colonialism had a great impact in Surakarta after 1 8 4 7 .45 
The changes introduced into the system of royal administration went 
right down to the village level. The structure of royal government now 
had at its apex the Office of the Kapatihan under the Patih, who was 
assisted in his functions by four Bupati Nayoko.46 The entire corps of 
officials in the Kapatihan were known as the Rdh Kapatihan. The second 
level of government was the kabupatSn, under a Bupati assisted by a 
Bupati Anom; the third was the District under a PanSwu; the fourth was 
the Subdistrict under an Assistant Wedono or Mantri Onderdistrik; and 
fifth  was the Kalurahan Desa under a Kepala Desa [Village Headman].
After the Proclamation of Independence, the governance of the 
Territory of Surakarta was regulated by laws promulgated by the central 
government.47 In September 1945, a Komite Nasional Daerah (KND) was 
formed, headed by K .P .H . Mr. Sumodiningrat, assisted by nine others.
On October 1, 1945 a Governing Council was formed under Soeprapto, 
Soetopo Adisapoetro and Soemantri. The formation of this council can 
be seen as the beginning of the democratization of the traditional 
bureaucracy. That same month, the central government appointed R .P. 
Soeroso as High Commissioner in Surakarta. The Working Committee of 
the KND urged the formation of a Directorate system of government.
This meant the development of a collegial administration shared between 
the Sunanate, the Mangkunegaran and the Republic's territorial adminis­
tration. But the Sunanate and the Mangkunegaran refused to send repre­
sentatives to participate in this new structure. It was the Mangkune-
44. In forming a new political order, the ruling class generally tries to enlist 
the help of the lower classes. See Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 117.
45. How great the changes were can be seen from the reorganization of the terri­
tories of Surakarta by the Dutch government in Staatsblad (1847) and (1848).
The changes were proposed by Van Nes, the Adviser to the Principalities. See 
Soepomo, De Reorganisatie, p. 20.
46. These Bupati Nayoko were: the Bupati Keparak Kiwo, the Bupati Keparak Tengen, 
the Bupati Gedong Kiwo and the Bupati Gedong Tengen.
47. On the development of local government in Surakarta, see The Liang Gie, Perturn- 
buhan Pemerintahan Daerah Dinegara Republik Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 
1967), I, pp. 90-95.
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garan which was most strongly opposed. It seems clear that this in ­
stance demonstrates how in the process of changing the nature of local 
government in Surakarta the aristocrats acted as an obstructionist 
social force.
The central government proposed the formation of a special com­
mittee, to draw up legal provisions regulating the governments of the 
Sunanate and the Mangkunegaran. Membership of this committee consisted 
of those members of the kaum ningrat who could be termed revolutionary 
aristocrats--including Mr. Atmodiningrat and G .P .H . Hadiwidjojo--and 
intellectuals, political elites , religious leaders, for example, I . J . 
Kasimo, Singgih, Soeprapto, Sindu Sawarno, Sindiredjo and Sarsadi.
This committee decided to reject the formation of a Special Region and, 
on the contrary, to support the formation of a normal residency. How­
ever, the Ministry of the Interior, then under Dr. Sudarsono, wanted to 
form a Special Region as was done in Yogyakarta.
Very rapidly there sprang up groups which were pro and anti the 
formation of a Special Region. And among the officials employed in the 
Sunanate and Mangkunegaran administrations serious political conflicts 
developed. The main reasons for the great difficulty that the central 
government experienced in forming a regional government in Surakarta 
were: (a) the psychology of the aristocrats; (b) political mobiliza­
tion in this area; (c) the popular will to change the feudal system and 
make Surakarta an integral part of the national state. In this context 
it was widely felt that the kaum ningrat group would have to change 
their attitude and support the national revolution.
At the beginning of June 1946 a People's and Army Territorial 
Government of Surakarta was formed. This new structure of local gov­
ernment was run by a Working Committee made up of military men, party 
leaders and religious notables.48 Governor Surjo was appointed by the 
center to act as adviser to this government. Shortly thereafter a 
Surakarta Regional Defense Council was established. In August 1946 
these bodies were replaced by a Badan Legislatif and Badan Eksekutif 
[Legislative and Executive Body]. In the end the Residency of Sura­
karta was ruled by the Resident together with the Executive Body, which 
was composed of party representatives (e .g . ,  from the PNI, the PS, Mas- 
yumi, the PBI) and youth. It is understandable, therefore, that in 
August 1946 the structure of government in Surakarta consisted of Resi­
dency, Kabupat&n, Kawedanan and Kalurahan, and that in the city itself 
a special administrative unit was created, known later as the Haminte.49 
Governance was carried on by the Executive Body and the Badan Perwaki- 
lan Rakyat.50 The Residency of Surakarta now consisted of the kabu- 
patdn of Boyolali, KlatSn and Srag§n (from the old Sunanate) and of 
Wonogiri and Karanganyar (from the old Mangkunegaran). With the forma­
tion of the municipal government known as the Haminte, Surakarta became 
the first autonomous city formed by the central government. The estab­
lishment of the Haminte meant the unification of the zones of the city 
formerly under Sunan Pakubuwono XII and Mangkunegoro V I I I .
48. Among the leaders of the political parties at that time, the more noteworthy 
names included: Soemodihardjo, Soejono, Soediro, Soetarto. This government
had the following sections in it: general affairs, social affairs, economic
affairs, security, and civil service.
49. See The Liang Gie, Pertumbuhan, pp. 93-94.
50. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
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In December 1949 the government of the Military Governor of the 
Second Special Region formed a military administration. Two days later 
it was announced that there would be only one government in the Resi­
dency- -the government of the Republic of Indonesia--and that the city 
would be governed by a mayor. In March 1950 the Sunanate and the Mang- 
kunegaran were "frozen" and their administrative authority was reduced 
to the internal affairs of their kraton.51 Most of their officials 
transferred to the Republicfs administrative structure. Only a very 
small fraction stayed loyal to the Sunan and the Mangkunegoro.
An important development in the rural areas was the formation there 
of autonomous local governments, a process which began at the start of 
1946. In the villages there developed what was called daulat: 52 village 
heads who had held their posts from before 1945 were elected again by 
the people.53 54 The revolutionary process in the countryside thus re­
sulted in defeudalization and democratization. For the duration of the 
Independence Wars of 1947 and 1948 military governments were established 
at the kecamatan and village levels. This also meant growing political 
mobilization in the villages as a result of the Revolution. And in the 
rural areas, new political groups succeeded in taking power in various 
localities . 5Lf
Conclusions
Research on the history of the Revolution in a region of Indonesia 
reveals that it was influenced by socio-cultural factors. Here the 
ecological and microsociological aspects must be studied to be able to 
develop a detailed microhistory.55
The Indonesian Revolution was not simply a process of decoloniza­
tion. It was a total revolution which involved the spontaneous strug­
gle of the people. We know well the role of the people in the villages 
and in the towns in the guerrilla fig h tin g .56 The Indonesian Revolu­
tion was not merely a struggle between the diplomats in the elite and 
the Dutch, but involved the formation of ideas for transforming the 
system of government from a colonial to a national structure. In this
51. This "freezing" was done on the basis of the Decision of the Minister of the 
Interior of March 3, 1950, No. F.X. 3/1/13.
52. Smail explains the word daulat as: "an old word meaning homage,1 which is the
root of the modern word kedaulatan (sovereignty)." See Smail, Bandung, p. 122, 
n. 54.
53. My research in the kabupaten of Sragen indicates that of the 100 or so village 
headmen who held office from before 1945, about 80 were directly re-elected by 
their villagers in 1946.
54. "Political group" is one whose administrative staff enforces order within a 
given territorial area by application and threat of physical force. See Tima- 
sheff, Sociological Theory, p. 180.
55. On the concept of microhistory, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Beberapa Masalah 
Teori dan MetodologiSedjarah Indonesia," Lembaran Sedjarah, No. 6 (1970).
56. See, for example, T. B. Simatupang, Laporan Dari Banaran (Jakarta: Pembangunan, 
1960), and Smail’s analysis of this work in Sinar Harapan, April 3 and 5, 1973.
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transitional period there arose new social classes which tried to push 
forward the current of the Revolution both at the national and the re­
gional levels. The popular struggle was accompanied by social and 
political conflicts between different groups in society. The popular 
organizations in principle accepted the general values of the Revolu­
tion. The political process during the Revolution can be viewed as 
social interaction between different groups in society. This p o liti­
cal process gave rise to political tension between the political 
parties and the governmental elite which was very evident in the fre­
quency with which cabinets fe ll .
Closer contact between villagers and government officials and the 
military caused a political mobilization in the rural areas. New 
social classes arose in the villages which led the rural revolution as 
part of the national revolution. They formed semi-military, political 
and religious organizations to defend the Revolution. They led their 
areas by selecting their own leaders.
Conservative elements in the feudal group sharpened the antago­
nisms between them and the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries had 
many progressive elements, idealism (especially among the youth), with 
the fullest hopes for the future.
So it can no longer be doubted that the Indonesian Revolution was 
a revolution full of social and political crises. In strongly feudal 
regions there occurred a cultural disintegration as a result of the 
process of democratization and other general values of the Revolution. 
It is clear that the Indonesian Revolution was "multicomplex" in the 
social transformations that it brought about.
